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A relational view of mathematical concepts 
 
Alf Coles 
Graduate School of Education, University of Bristol 
 
 
Many concepts used in mathematics appear self-evidently to be relations. Speed is a 
relation between distance and time (which are themselves relations); fractions and 
ratios can both, in different ways, be seen as relations between numbers or lengths or 
quantities; volume is a relation between one shape and a unit (typically a unit cube); 
the gradient of a graph is a relation between ‘rise’ and ‘run’. In this chapter, I aim to 
show that there is considerable pedagogical advantage in viewing every mathematical 
concept as a relation. I aim to show that by introducing mathematical concepts as 
relations, supposed problems for children in abstraction fall away and learning can 
become fast, imaginative and engaging. The arguments are primarily pragmatic and 
empirical ones, based on classroom experiences and experiments. The view of 
mathematical concepts as relations entails a disruption of the notion that learning 
proceeds through abstraction from manipulating concrete objects, to visual models 
and culminating in abstract entities and instead suggests a more circular conception of 
learning and development. 
 
It is not easy to pin down what kind of a thing a relation is; I take examples of 
relations to be differences, similarities and comparisons and wish to distinguish 
relations from the objects that are being compared or related. I suggest this difference 
is one of perspective and sometimes choice – it is perhaps possible to view any object 
(whether real or imagined) as a relation and any relation as an object. An exercise 
used at the start of art-college, when faced with a still life, is to move focus away 
from drawing the things on the table, to the spaces in-between. Instead of focusing on 
the black text of this page, I invite you to shift attention to the meandering lines of 
whiteness than run down the page. These are shifts in perception from noticing 
objects to noticing relations. There is a choice to be made. At moments of insight, we 
re-see, re-think, re-cognize what we have been attending to. The poet and philosopher 
Jan Zwicky suggests, ‘all genuine understanding is a form of seeing-as’ (§3). 
Similarly, Gregory Bateson described the core of his scientific method as the search 
for a double description of phenomena, where “[relationships are] always a product 
of double description” (1979, p.132, emphasis in the original). When I claim, 
therefore, that mathematical concepts are relations this is not an ontological statement 
but rather a suggestion that seeing mathematical concepts as relations has advantages, 
particularly when this is accompanied by a symbolizing of relations rather than 
objects. I draw on writers who distinguish between abstract modes of thought and 
more concrete or empirical modes of thought. What I take this distinction to mean is 
that abstract thought deals with relations and concrete or empirical modes of thought 
deal with objects. 
 
The structure of this chapter follows the logic of Walter McCullough’s challenge: 
‘what is a number, that a man (sic) may know it, and a man, that he may know a 
number?’(1960). To begin, and in order to approach the idea that every mathematical 
concept is a relation, I take the case of the early learning of number, this leads to a 
consideration of human cognition more broadly and then suggestions for how other 
areas of the curriculum can be approached in a relational manner. 
 What is a number, that a woman may know it? 
 
Bass (2015) suggested there are two competing narratives around the development of 
number sense and its culmination in an awareness of real numbers and the number 
line. The predominant narrative in schooling is a ‘counting world’. Number is 
introduced as a label for distinct objects and so, when mapped to an imagined number 
line, numbers are individual marks. From this point, the number line must be 
progressively ‘filled in’, with negative numbers, rational numbers and ultimately real 
numbers. Such an approach leads to significant difficulties for students in the jump to 
the existence of the rationals and then to the existence of the reals. If the basic 
conception of number is to stand for objects, a disruption to this idea is needed to 
make sense of fractions. Perhaps another way of saying this is that starting with the 
notion of number as standing for discrete objects, we introduce number to students in 
an ‘empirical’ mode of thought (Goutard, 1964) and this way of thinking is not 
adequate to conceptualise further developments in mathematics. 
 
Bass’s alternative approach to number (and the one I advocate in this chapter) is a 
‘measurement world’, or I would prefer to call it a ‘relational world’. Bass draws on 
Davydov’s curriculum (1990) as an exemplar of what it might mean to introduce 
number not as standing for objects, but as measure. In terms of a number line, whole 
numbers can be seen as scalings of a unit length. The number line is ‘full’ from the 
very start in the sense that, intuitively speaking, a scaling can get you anywhere on a 
line. There is no conceptual stumbling block in moving from integer to fractional 
scalings. Ma (2015) proposed that the basis for arithmetic is an awareness of 
quantitative relations. In the counting world, this is undoubtedly the case. However in 
the measurement world (and for Davydov), before associating specific numbers with 
specific scalings, awareness can be developed of the broader relations of ‘greater 
than’ and ‘less than’ as the basis for number sense. As well as Davydov, Gattegno 
(1974) also developed a programme that introduced number not in the context of 
groups of objects. As far as I am aware their programmes have never been closely 
compared yet, as I hope to draw out below, there are striking similarities which lead 
to implications for the whole mathematics curriculum. 
 
Caleb Gattegno (1911-1988), born in Egypt, worked across the world developing a 
mathematics curriculum based in the use of the Cuisenaire rods1. Vasily Davydov 
(1930-1988) was born and worked in Russia and at around the same time as Gattegno 
developed a curriculum that was implemented in schools in Russia. Both educators 
have their advocates today, for example, Gattegno has inspired the Bronx Charter 
School in New York and Davydov’s ideas are behind the ‘Measure Up’ programme 
(Dougherty, 2008). 
 
In both programmes for mathematics, children’s first lessons revolve around 
experiences with objects of different lengths. Gattegno (1963) suggests children have 
some time of ‘free play’ with the Cuisenaire rods. There is a conviction that children 
will quite naturally begin making comparisons. Initially the comparisons are ‘greater 
than’ and ‘less than’. An important step (again in both curricula) is the use of aligning 
                                                 
1 Cuisenaire rods are cuboids with 1cm2 cross-sections and ranging in length from 1 to 10cm. Each 
length is coloured uniquely (eg the cube with 1cm lengths is white, the rod of length 2cm is red). 
lengths for comparison. And, equally important, if one rod or length is longer than 
another, then a third rod/length can be added to make the lengths the same. Madeline 
Goutard worked closely with Gattegno in developing the use of Cuisenaire rods and 
wrote a book (1964) in which she detailed her approach. An early activity she would 
do with children, once they have become familiar with the rods and begun making 
comparisons between lengths, was to focus on the length ‘to be added’. This length 
can be associated with a subtraction and Goutard would get children working on 
‘families of subtractions’, i.e., pairs or trains of rods where what is ‘to be added’ is the 
same. 
 
Figure 12.1: ‘Families of equivalent subtractions’ (adapted from Goutard, 1964) 
 
Davydov worked with a variety of materials (i.e., there is no equivalent of the central 
place for the Cuisenaire rods) however the focus, as with Gattegno, was on 
comparison of measures (whether this be a measure of length, area or volume). At 
some point, there would also be a focus on ‘how much’ difference there is between 
two lengths (see Figure 12.2). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 A  >  B  A  >  B by C     
 
Figure 12.2: Schematic (adapted from Schmittau, 2005, p.19) 
 
Both programmes would get students in the first grade codifying relations such as in 
Figures 1 and 2, by using letters. Gattegno labels each of the Cuisenaire rods with a 
letter indicating the colour name, Davydov would use A, B, C to represent the 
different lengths. The kinds of statements that students would produce are, for 
Goutard’s families of equivalent subtractions: 
 𝑝 = 𝑏 − 𝑦 = 𝑑 − 𝑟 = ⋯ 
 
and, for Schmittau: 
A = B + C 
   B = A – C 
A 
B 
C 
   C = A – B 
 
It is important to note that no numbers are used (on either programme) to represent 
lengths. In both Davydov and Gattegno’s curricula, number is first introduced as a 
comparison of measurements, when we have the special case that you can use copies 
of the same length to make a longer length. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12.3: The introduction of numbers 
 
For Gattegno, the kind of relationship in Figure 3 is used to introduce the number ‘2’ 
and immediately (as the second number to appear) the number ‘½’.  
𝑝 = 2𝑟 and the equivalent, 𝑟 =
1
2
𝑝 (Gattegno, 1963, p.29) 
 
For Davydov, the role of the ‘unit’ in measurement is central. From a comparison of 
lengths, as with Gattegno, the first numbers introduced are in some sense a scaling. 
Children are encouraged to create their own notation to signify the number of times a 
unit measure fits into a longer length, for example: 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12.4: A notation of comparison (adapted from Schmittau, 2000, p.66) 
 
As Schmittau explains: ‘From this, the idea of the counting sequence is developed, as 
a tool for labeling how many units make up any particular quantity. Then the concept 
of number is developed as a relationship of quantities.’ (ibid). This relationship is 
expressed as follows: 
 
𝐵 = 5𝑈 and the equivalent, 
𝐵
𝑈
= 5 (ibid) 
 
As with Gattegno, this scaling is expressed in two different ways, although there is a 
significant difference in the second expression. Whereas Davydov, in some ways 
‘defines’ number as the ratio of lengths (
𝐵
𝑈
= 5), Gattegno stays with the use of 
number as an ‘operator’ (or scale factor) and so introduces fractions in the first grade 
to capture the inverse relationship (𝑟 =
1
2
𝑝). 
 
These parallels in the development and introduction of number are striking. What is 
also clear from both treatments is that number is not being linked to collections of 
objects, or at least, not only to collections of objects. Number is first seen as a 
dynamic relation. Through introducing number as a relation between quantities, whole 
numbers become, in effect, scale factors. 5U or 2r mean “take five of the unit length” 
and “take two of the red rod”. Numbers are brought into existence through the action 
of placing objects against each other. 
 
U B 
Gattegno makes use of this relational view of number to work with fractions. For 
anyone skeptical about whether it really is possible to get children aged 6 or 7 
working with fractions, it is only necessary to watch a video clip of Gattegno teaching 
(http://www.calebgattegno.org/mathematics-at-your-fingertips.html) where in one 
hour children (who have gained familiarity earlier in the year with the rods) move 
from being introduced to fraction notation, to being able to solve the following 
questions:  
1
2
× (36 − 18) = 
 
1
3
× (18 + 9) = 
 
1
4
× (9 + 27) = 
 
1
2
× (9 +
1
3
× 27) −
1
4
× 36 = 
 
These questions would not be out of place on test items for 14 or even 16 year olds in 
the UK and yet were tackled confidently by 6-7 year olds. Similarly, Davydov 
develops schematics for working with part-whole relations and students quite quickly 
are able to solve problems involving proportional reasoning that would usually only 
be tackled much later on in a typical UK or US mathematics curriculum. Students can 
find the shift into proportional reasoning a significant barrier in learning mathematics. 
The remarkable idea of both Gattegno and Davydov is that this problem can be 
avoided by introducing number, from the very start, as a proportional relation, within 
a ‘measuring’ or relational world rather than a ‘counting’ world. And, because the 
symbols are relations it seems, furthermore, that the step to considering symbols in 
relation to one another, leaving behind the objects from which they initially arose, 
also occurs swiftly for students. It is evident from the discussion above that when 
symbolizing (relationally) Figures 3 or 4, there are several descriptions possible – 
viewing the relation from different perspectives. So, from the very start, students are 
considering relations between symbolic descriptions (e.g., the connection between 2 
and ½). 
 
An obvious question begged by the relational approach to number and its apparent 
power, is whether the whole curriculum can be treated in similar manner. In thinking 
about this question, I have found it useful to reflect on what, in these approaches to 
number, is being symbolized. Clearly, from what has been discussed above, I suggest 
that numerals denote relations (between lengths). However, what is also highly 
significant is that number symbols are initially used to stand for an action performed 
on the lengths or rods. The relation captured by ‘2’ or ‘½’ in Figure 3 is performed by 
students, in the sense that they place the rods in that special configuration and, from 
their previous work with rods, likely with the awareness that other comparisons of 
lengths leave something left over. Also important is that different sets of rods are 
arranged in the same configuration (2 whites and 1 red; 2 yellows and 1 orange, etc) 
so that ‘2’ is not associated with particular rods but with what is common to a range 
of instantiations of putting two of the same rod precisely against a third. What is not 
being symbolized with a numeral, at least initially, is any actual length.  
 Reflecting on the effect of these pedagogical moves it becomes apparent, as I hope to 
show in the next section, that what happens to learners is not captured by the 
orthodoxy to a developmental sequence of, say, moving from concrete to visual to 
abstract. Making this point takes us into questions of what it is to be a human 
(learning about number). 
 
What is a woman, that she may know a number? 
 
The orthodoxy in the UK in the early years of education and schooling is that children 
need to work with concrete materials or manipulables to develop their understanding 
of number. Goutard (1964) pointed to this phenomena: 
 
It is generally agreed that concrete experience must be the foundation of 
mathematics learning. When children find it difficult to understand arithmetic it is 
at once suggested that this is because it is too abstract; for small children the 
study is then simply reduced to the counting of objects. (1964, p.3) 
 
The importance of the concrete in the learning of mathematics is given a more recent 
interpretation through, for example, the work of Lakoff and Nunez (2000) who 
suggested a bodily basis for all mathematical meaning. From this ‘embodied’ stance, 
our understanding of number begins with bodily experiences (for example rhythmic 
clapping, walking up steps) and we progressively abstract from these experiences, re-
organising our perception and culminating in symbolic representations of our actions.  
 
However, there is a well-known paradox linked to this familiar story of the movement 
from the concrete (perhaps via the ‘visual’) to the abstract. Piaget summed up the 
paradox as follows: ‘that adaptation to the concrete experimental facts is dependent 
upon the abstract character of the theoretical framework, which allows analysis and 
apprehension of these facts’ (1976, p.353). In order to make sense of our perceptions 
we need to have some kind of abstract framework within which they fit. Yet we can 
seemingly only develop these frameworks via abstraction from experience of our 
perceptions. There is a circularity here: we need abstract structures to make sense of 
perception and we need perception to build abstract structures (a version of this 
paradox is the focus of the chapter in this book by Wolff-Michael Roth). Some 
evidence for the existence of such a circular ‘trap’ comes from Piaget’s experiments 
with young children. He observed:  
 
It is obviously not sufficient to make a correct observation of something for it to 
be accepted, if there appear to be valid reasons for refusing (or repressing) it … if 
the subject feels that what he (sic) sees happen should not have happened, then 
this observation is not retained or conceptualized. (1976, p.214) 
 
Piaget observed children ignore results of experiments they had performed accurately 
(for example using a simple catapult to throw a rubber into a bin) when it came to 
describing or predicting what to do. A child might have a ‘know-how’ and yet 
seemingly lack the abstract structures needed to make sense of this know-how. Piaget 
embraced a ‘circular relationship between subject and object’ (ibid, p.343) and arrived 
at the view that:  
 
The subject only learns to know himself when acting on the object, and the latter 
can become known only as a result of progress of the actions carried out on it … 
this explains the harmony between thought and reality, since action springs from 
the laws of an organism that is simultaneously one physical object among many 
and the source of the acting, then thinking, subject. (ibid) 
 
The circularity and entanglement in the emergence of subject and object is a key 
insight behind the world-view of enactivism (Varela, Thompson, Rosch, 1991), which 
offers a way through the paradox of how learning and abstraction take place. One 
difficulty in proposing a viewpoint such as enactivism is that our established patterns 
of thinking are so firmly embedded in the conviction of the separability of subject and 
object and, as Piaget notes, humans are very good at refusing or repressing evidence 
that does not fit an existing way of thinking. One way to catch ourselves out, and 
allow the possibility of a different perspective, is a consideration of illusions. (For 
Maturana, a key enactivist thinker, the impossibility of knowing, in the moment, 
whether a perception is an illusion or not led to an insight about the informational 
closure of living systems (Maturana and Poerksen, 2004).) 
 
Consider the illusion in Figure 12.5. Focus on the two lines of grey tiles; do you see 
the greys as the same shade? 
 
     
   
     
   
     
   
     
   
     
 
Figure 12.5: The Munker-White illusion 
 
It seems that humans experience these greys as different. Now turn over the page and 
look at Figure 12.6, where the same tiles are reproduced, but this time without one 
column of black. In this configuration there seems to be no difficulty in seeing the 
grey shading as the same (or at least much closer in tone than before), yet it is the 
identical grey to that used throughout Figure 5. How is it possible to explain the 
phenomena you have just experienced?  
 
What seems clear from this experiment is that in Figure 12.5, we do not perceive the 
colours ‘in themselves’. This is an example of a family of illusions where it seems as 
though the context leads us ‘astray’. The reason for the difference in the way the grey 
looks in Figure 12.5 has something to do with expectations linked to the pattern of 
light and dark in the other tiles. In other words, it seems that we do not perceive the 
grey colour per se, or at least, the context of the grey alters how we perceive it. This 
has always been known to artists, no doubt; the quilter Kaffe Fassett, famous for his 
bright designs, talks about the importance of dull and grey colours in his design in 
terms of the overall colour effect (personal communication).  
 
It might be easy to dismiss this illusion as a gimmick, or to imagine that in this 
instance we simply need to do some alterations to Figure 12.5 in order to see the 
colours ‘as they really are’. However, the illusion suggests a more radical view. To 
put this at its starkest, since we always perceive colours in a context, we can never see 
colours ‘as they really are’ – indeed the entire concept of colour ‘as it really is’ does 
not even make sense. Therefore, it is not actually the case that we perceive ‘colours’ 
as such, rather, we perceive relations between colours. Even when we know the 
illusion it seems impossible to 'see' the greys in Figure 12.5 as the same. 
 
     
   
     
   
     
   
     
   
     
 
Figure 12.6: The illusion unmade 
 
But if we can only make sense of our colour perception of objects through a 
consideration of context, then it cannot be the case that we really perceive objects at 
all (what is true of colour will be true of all modalities of perception). Although I may 
experience the world as a set of discrete objects, if context plays such an important 
role then the separation of objects from each other (and hence from me) is really a 
fiction. Again, this is something that has been well known to artists, and connects 
back to Piaget’s insight about the importance of abstract frameworks in perception: 
 
to see an object is always to perform an abstraction because seeing consists in the 
grasping of structural features rather than in the indiscriminate recording of detail 
(Arnheim, 1969, p.68). 
 
We can of course notice details but when we do, this is preceded by an awareness of 
more general, abstract and structural features, ‘generalities precede particulars in 
sensory experience’ (Arnheim, 1969, p.221) – precisely what Piaget concluded from 
his experiments. The enactivist conviction (drawing on, for example: Bateson, 1972; 
Maturana and Varela, 1987) is that the core cognitive function is to make distinctions 
and that even the most basic of organisms operate in the world through acting on 
relations and differences rather than a representation or awareness of objects, as the 
colour illusion above illustrates for humans. In other words, there need be no paradox 
in abstraction coming before particulars, when abstraction is taken to mean attention 
to relations, if our basic mental function is to attend to relations and differences. 
 
Re-casting the concrete-abstract divide 
 
If humans perceive relations and distinctions then the typical developmental sequence 
of a move from sensori-motor operations to the mapping onto those sensori-motor 
experiences of more formal operations is put into question (something also critiqued 
in deFreitas and Sinclair (this volume, Proposition 2)). The relation ‘double’ (e.g., in 
Figure 3) does not exist in either the smaller or the larger rods but arises through a 
human comparison between them. In this sense, relations and differences are always 
already abstracted from the objects that give rise to them. If distinctions are the basic 
mental function, then whatever problems children have with mathematics it cannot be 
due to difficulties of abstraction. Rather, it may be that the approach to (for example) 
early number development, in emphasizing objects, is establishing a pattern of 
thinking about mathematics that makes it difficult.  
 
Goutard (1964) distinguished ‘empirical’ thought (about objects) from more structural 
awareness (of relationships). While the objects of mathematics become more and 
more complex and abstract (for example, we study number patterns that are codified 
as functions and then treat functions as objects in order to consider their properties, 
and so on) it does not follow that structural (or relational) thinking is hard, only that 
the structures about which mathematicians are concerned become nested, one built on 
another. In the introduction to her book describing her experiences using Cuisenaire 
rods, Goutard considers this division in ways of thinking: 
 
It seems to me that there has perhaps been too great-a tendency to make things 
concrete and that perhaps the difficulties children experience spring from the fact 
that they are kept too much at the concrete level and are forced to use too 
empirical a mode of thought. (1964, p.3) 
 
Davydov and Gattegno offer mechanisms for children, from the very beginning, to 
engage in thinking that is not limited to the concrete or empirical level of thought. It 
may appear paradoxical that the use of Cuisenaire rods can be talked about, as above, 
in relation to moving students away from the concrete. And this is where what makes 
all the difference is what is being symbolized. If, in using Cuisenaire rods, the white 
rod is always associated with ‘1’, the red rod with ‘2’ and so on, then the use of the 
rods will remain in an ‘empirical mode of thought’ and the entire power of Gattegno’s 
approach is lost. By introducing numbers as relations, abstracted from the concrete 
context at the very start, there is no concrete-abstract divide to cross, for children. 
Number symbols (initially ‘2’ and ‘½’) denote a particular configuration of material 
objects but quickly take on properties in relation to each other. In Coles (2014) I 
described work with children using a visual image (the Gattegno tens chart) where 
there was precisely this sense of symbols arising for actions and relations within the 
chart and then children quickly focusing on relations between the symbols 
themselves. 
 
Some evidence for there being more than one way of thinking about the objects of 
mathematics comes from recent neuroscientific studies related to early number 
development. Lyons and Beilock (2013) tested subjects performing basic number 
tasks such as comparison of size and judgment of whether numerals were in order (4, 
5, 6 are in order; 4, 6, 5 are not). What they discovered is that similar patterns of brain 
activity are present when comparing the sizes of numerals, or collections of dots and 
even when judging if three sets of dots are in order of size (perhaps all these are 
examples of Goutard’s ‘empirical’ thinking) and that a different pattern of brain 
activity is aroused by being asked to make (ordinal) comparisons of whether three 
numerals are in sequence (perhaps requiring more structural or relational awareness). 
Not only this, but the kinds of brain activity used in the latter task are similar to those 
used in more complex arithmetic and, furthermore, speed at this kind of ordinal 
awareness is the best predictor (compared to speed at any of the other size comparison 
tasks) of overall mathematical attainment from grades 2 to 6 (Lyons et al., 2014). 
 
The proposal suggested by the considerations above is therefore that the paradox of 
the concrete-abstract divide in learning number only arises if children are forced to 
associate numerals too strongly with collections of objects. If, instead, children are 
introduced to number symbols as relations then they can be inducted, from the start, 
into the way of thinking about and with number that is needed for success in 
mathematics. And what is true of number (that it can be introduced relationally), I aim 
to show in the next section, is true of every mathematical concept. 
 
All mathematical concepts as relations 
 
In order to develop an entire curriculum on the basis of mathematical concepts as 
relations, it is necessary to devise starting points where what can be symbolized are 
actions and transformations of objects or images. There is not space to deal with every 
aspect of the curriculum so in this section I take three concepts and show how they 
can be thought of as relations and how, in doing this, some re-ordering of the 
traditional order of curriculum topics may be required. These three concepts are 
chosen as illustrative and include one example from primary, secondary and post-16 
phases of schooling. 
 
Area as a relation 
 
The concept of area can be considered in an empirical manner, with concrete objects 
or visual images and it is a concept that children can have difficulty with. However, 
‘area’ is an inherently relational concept when considered as a relationship to a unit. 
In a similar manner to the way that Gattegno introduces the symbol ‘2’ to represent 
‘double’ rather than two objects, an area of ‘2’ can be introduced to represent the 
situation of one shape fitting into another shape twice (and hence also the first shape 
has an area ½ the second shape). A relational approach to area would not be so much 
concerned with attaching numerical values to the sizes of shapes as in comparing 
them. Which are bigger? Which are smaller? And then considering the case where one 
shape can fit an exact number of times into another shape. In essence, by considering 
area as a relation, the concept arises out of the wider mathematical structure of 
transformation geometry and, in particular, enlargements. It might be, therefore, that 
we work on enlargements with students before area (a reverse of the typical 
sequence). It seems, at the least, that there are indeterminate relations between these 
concepts and ones we typically see as necessary to build on others are not definitively 
so; any curriculum needs flexibility, therefore, to be responsive to students’ 
awareness. It would be possible to use awarenesses about area to work on 
enlargements but equally possible to use awarenesses about enlargement to work on 
area. 
 
Algebra as relation  
 
In the book ‘Starting Points’ (Banwell, Saunders and Tahta, 1986) there is the 
proposal that whenever functional relationships are discovered by children or being 
considered in a lesson, that there is always the same way of representing them, in a 
tabular form: 
   
 
 
 
 
Table 12.1: A function representation 
 
One way of setting up this representation is through the ‘function game’ (also 
described in Brown and Waddingham, 1982). The teacher has a rule in mind 
(‘doubling’ in the case of Table 1) and writes out two ‘inputs’ with arrows to the 
‘output’ and then writes a third input and invites the class to guess the output. This 
game can be powerful when played in silence, with the teachers (and later perhaps a 
student) indicating if the output is correct with a  or . At some point, when most 
of the class have figured out the rule, the teacher might put ‘n’ as the input, to invite a 
sharing of these rules. Even with a rule as simple as ‘doubling’ there may be 
differences in how students were applying the rule, that can be captured in their 
algebraic expressions (e.g., 𝑛 + 𝑛, or 𝑛 × 2, or 2𝑛). The teacher can also put ‘n’ in the 
‘output’ column, with the arrow backwards and invite expressions for the inverse of 
the rule they have just found. 
 
Algebra, in this treatment, represents a relationship between two sets of numbers and 
working on functions can provide a motivation to consider more routine or technical 
algebraic techniques (for example, in showing why all the different algebraic rules are 
the same). In a standard UK curriculum, rather than an introduction to algebra, 
functions would typically appear much later. 
 
Complex numbers as relations 
 
A complex number can be seen as a relation if it is considered as a function that 
transforms shapes. Because complex numbers need two dimensions to represent them, 
to get a sense of how they might transform a shape, we need two sets of (2D) axes. 
Figure 12.7 shows how a circle is transformed under the operation,   
 
  
 
Figure 12.7: A representation of  
z®2z
z®2z
3 6 
5 10 
6 12 
  
 The pre-requisite to considering complex numbers as relations is to know i as the 
square root of negative 1, and to know how to express complex numbers on an 
Argand diagram. Starting with the left hand diagram, students can be invited to 
conjecture what the shape would be transformed to, if both real and imaginary parts 
were doubled. For example, i, at (0,1) on the diagram above, will be mapped to 2i, at 
(0,2) on the right hand diagram.  
 
From my own experience of teaching, students can quite quickly become independent 
in testing other complex transformations and generating their own pairs of images. In 
each case, students can be invited to predict and test what transformation will be 
described. A potential mathematical appreciation on offer in this activity is around the 
relations between one entire system (transformation geometry, e.g., translations, 
rotations, reflections, enlargement) into another system (complex numbers). It is also 
possible to work on the relations between the transformation entailed in a matrix 
[
𝑎 𝑏
𝑐 𝑑
] and an equivalent complex number (e.g., [
0 −1
1 0
] is a rotation of -90 degrees 
around the origin and is therefore equivalent to i). Again, the sense of complex 
numbers as transformations would typically appear late on in any course that 
introduced complex numbers. The activity above can set up the ideas of the 
geometrical interpretation of multiplication by complex numbers, leading to 
deMoivre’s theorem, viewed as a statement about transformations. 
 
Discussion 
 
The three examples above and the case of number discussed earlier indicate how a 
selection of mathematical concepts can be interpreted as relations. It is the proposal of 
this chapter that every concept can be treated in a similar manner. As has been clear in 
the four examples, the view of mathematical concepts as relations disrupts the typical 
sequence of the treatment of ideas, generally by familiarizing students with a wider 
‘whole’, out of which particular concepts arise. To generate starting points that allow 
a relational view of mathematical concepts there is a need to focus on broader 
(mathematical) structures. There is an important role for visible or tangible objects 
(Gattegno, 1974) but also a danger, if these are used to symbolize concepts too 
directly. If a concept is to be approached relationally, then images or materials are 
needed where what can be symbolized are actions on or relations between the 
materials, or within the images.  
 
As a mathematician, if I am presented with an expression such as, 2𝑥2 + 7𝑥 − 9, a 
whole host of associations arise, I may recognize the statement as an expression that 
can be factorized, I may picture the graph, or the quadratic formula may come to 
mind. Depending on what I may be asked, or decide, to do next particular associations 
will be foregrounded and others will fade. The concepts and associations I invoke 
primarily gain their use and meaning from their links to other concepts. If concepts 
have been introduced as relations, then a symbol’s links to physical objects or images 
take their places as just some among a myriad of connections. When introduced as 
relations, children can access their imaginations when working with symbols, as 
mathematicians do. It is the perspective of this chapter that difficulties in mathematics 
are much more likely to arise from children not having access to any imaginative 
response to symbols (such as my reaction to the equation above) rather than any 
supposed lack of capacity for abstract thinking (thinking that is amply demonstrated 
by anyone who has taught themselves their first language). Symbols are meaningful to 
mathematicians but not in a direct (‘this’ means ‘that’) manner. It is in part the 
ambiguity and flexibility of mathematical symbols that give them power and use; this 
is the game of mathematics, but it is a game that many students are not let in on. 
 
Gattegno and Davydov achieved extraordinary results when using their curricula. The 
pedagogical advantages of approaching concepts as relations, as has only been 
touched on in the examples above, include the following: 
- inverse operations can be considered simultaneously (e.g., fractions with 
integers; fractional enlargements with standard enlargements);  
- there is no disruption as ideas become more complex; relational images or 
representations will not need to be ‘unlearnt’, for example in the move from 
integers to fractions; 
- there is something the symbols ‘mean’ and can point to, as well as being 
abstract from the beginning; 
- linked to the point above, symbols can trigger the mathematical imagination, 
i.e., there is something that can be evoked by mathematical symbols if they are 
introduced as relations; 
- symbols can quickly take on relations to each other; because they are 
introduced in a complex whole there are other symbols they can relate to; 
- complexity can also be limited in the beginning to allow a gradual 
development, while still being ‘abstract’ from the start. 
 
Relations, are at once material (arising from a consideration of objects) and abstract 
(the relation of, say, ‘double’ is not linked directly to an object). They exist neither in 
the objects themselves, nor in any human mind but rather arise from the interaction of 
humans with the world and each other. Concepts are never fixed: each use adds a 
different complexion to the web of connections that surround it and changes us as 
humans, in the kind of circular relationship suggested by Piaget.  
 
References 
 
Arnheim, R. (1969) Visual thinking. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
 
Banwell, C., Saunders, K., & Tahta, D. (1986). Starting Points: for teaching 
mathematics in middle and secondary schools. St Albans, UK: Tarquin 
Publishers. 
 
Bass, H. (2015) Quantities, numbers, number names, and the real number line. In 
Xuhua Sun, Berinderjeet Kaur, Jarmila Novotna (eds.) Proceedings of The 
Twenty-Third ICMI Study: Primary Mathematics Study on Whole Numbers, 
Macau: University of Macau, pp.10-20 
 
Bateson, G. (1972). Steps to an ecology of mind. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 2000. 
Bateson, G. (1979). Mind and Nature: A Necessary Unity. New York: E. P. Dutton.  
Brown L., and Waddingham, J. (1982). An Addendum to Cockroft. Avon, RLDU 
(now available at the STEM centre website). 
 
Coles, A. (2014). Transitional devices. For the learning of mathematics, 34(2), 24-30 
 
Davydov, V. (1990). Types of generalization in instruction: Logical and 
psychological problems in the structuring of school curricula. Reston, VA: 
National Council of Teachers of Mathematics. 
 
Dougherty, B. (2008). Measure up: A quantitative view of early algebra. In Kaput, J. 
J., Carraher, D. W., & Blanton, M. L. (Eds.), Algebra in the early grades, (pp. 
389–412). Mahweh, NJ: Erlbaum. 
 
Gattegno, C. (1963) Mathematics with numbers in colour Book 1: Qualitative 
arithmetic, The study of numbers from 1 to 20. Educational Explorers Ltd: 
Reading 
 
Gattegno, C. (1974). The common sense of teaching mathematics. New York: 
Educational Solutions Worldwide Inc. (reprinted 2010). 
 
Goutard, M. (1964). Mathematics and Children: a reappraisal of our attitude. 
Educational Explorers Ltd: Reading 
 
Lakoff, G. & Nunez, R. (2000). Where Mathematics Comes From: How the 
Embodied Mind Brings Mathematics into Being. New York, NY: Basic Books 
 
Lyons I., Beilock S (2013). Ordinality and the nature of symbolic numbers. Journal of 
Neuroscience, 33(43):17052-61. 
 
Lyons I., Price G., Vaessen A., Blomert L., Ansari D. (2014). Numerical predictors of 
arithmetic success in grades 1–6. Developmental Science, 17(5), 714-726. 
 
Ma, L. (2015) The theoretical core of whole number arithmetic. In Xuhua Sun, 
Berinderjeet Kaur, Jarmila Novotna (eds.) Proceedings of The Twenty-Third 
ICMI Study: Primary Mathematics Study on Whole Numbers, Macau: University 
of Macau, pp.34-38 
 
Maturana, H., & Poerksen, B. (2004). From being to doing: The origins of the biology 
of cognition. Heidelberg, Germany: Carl Auer. 
 
Maturana, H., & Varela, F. (1987). The tree of knowledge: the biological roots of 
human understanding. Boston: Shambala. 
 
McCullough, W. (1960). Alfred Korzybski Memorial Lecture. General Semantics 
26/27, 7-18. 
 
Piaget, J. (1976) The grasp of consciousness: action and concept in the young child. 
London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. 
 
Scmittau, J., & Morris, A. (2004) The Development of Algebra in the Elementary 
Mathematics Curriculum of V.V. Davydov. The Mathematics Educator, 8(1), 60 
- 87  
 
Schmittau, J. (2005). The development of algebraic thinking: A Vygotskian 
perspective. ZDM, The International Journal of Mathematics Education, 37(1), 
16-22. 
 
Varela, F., Thompson, E., & Rosch, E. (1991). The embodied mind: cognitive science 
and human experience. Massachusetts: The MIT Press. 
 
Zwicky, J. (2014). Wisdom and metaphor. Edmonton & Calgary: Brush Education. 
 
 
 
 
